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Abstract
Bagwell (1995) argues that commitment in undermined by the
slightest imperfectness in observation. Guth, Ritzberger & Kirch-
steiger (1998) question this assertion: for any ﬁnite leader-follower
game, with arbitrary many players in each role and generic payoﬀs,
they show that there always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium out-
come that is accessible, i.e. it can be approximated by the outcome of
a mixed equilibrium of the game with imperfect observation.We show
that accessibility fails in a class of games played in economic environ-
ments, where the payoﬀs to commitment actions depend upon prices
set by other agents, prices being chosen from a continuum. Accessibil-
ity requires either that commitment is not required or that the price
setting agents have no monopoly power. Our result follows from a
generalized indiﬀerence principle which mixed strategies must satisfy
in such economic environments.
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1 Introduction
A key insight in Thomas Schelling’s classic book, The Strategy of Conﬂict, is
that the ability to commit oneself often confers a strategic advantage. While
Schelling emphasized the value of commitment in military and social situa-
tions, his insight has since been explored and formalized in diverse ﬁelds of
economics including industrial organization, international trade and political
economy — indeed, it is perhaps the most persistent idea in the explosion of
applications of game theory to economics since the 1980s. The foundations
of this literature have been questioned in a provocative paper by Bagwell
[1], who argues that the value of commitment in undermined by the slightest
amount of imperfect observation. Bagwell considers a leader-follower model,
where the leader’s chosen action (or commitment) is observed noisily by the
follower. He shows that the pure strategy equilibria of the noisy observation
game coincide with the pure strategy equilibria of the simultaneous move
game, where the follower has no observation of the leader’s action. Bagwell
interprets this result as saying that the slightest amount of noise completely
undermines the leader’s ability to commit.
Bagwell’s claim, and his focus on pure strategy equilibria, have been
questioned — pure strategy equilibria need not always exist in the noisy
game, e.g. if the simultaneous move game fails to have a pure strategy
equilibrium. van Damme and Hurkens [4] analyze the class of games with
one leader and one follower and generic payoﬀs. Such games have a unique
backward induction (or Stackelberg) outcome if observation is perfect. They
show that the Stackelberg outcome is always accessible – there exists a mixed
strategy equilibrium of the game with imperfect observation, whose outcome
converges to the Stackelberg outcome, as the noise in observation vanishes.1
1The noisy observation game will, in general, have multiple equilibria;van Damme and
Hurkens use equilibrium selection theory to argue that the mixed equilibrium supporting
the Stackelberg outcome is more likely to be played than any other equilibria. On the other
hand, Oecshsler and Schlag [10] use evolutionary dynamics to select the pure strategy non-
Stackelberg equilibrium. Huck and Muller [6] present experimental evidence showing that
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The accessibility result has been shown to be very general by Guth et. al. [5],
who consider ﬁnite leader-follower games with an arbitrary number of leaders
and arbitrary number of followers. If payoﬀs are generic, there always exists
an accessible subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with perfect
observation. 2 The proof of this proposition is based on a fundamental
property of generic extensive form games – the existence of a stable sets and
an essential component. This suggests that existence of accessible outcomes
is likely to be obtained for a very large class of games with generic payoﬀs.
These results oﬀer some comfort to the vast body of applied theory, which
analyzes multi-stage games. In particular, if a game has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium outcome, this will be accessible in generic scenarios. This
oﬀers an intellectual justiﬁcation for the fact that applied theory continues
to analyze models of commitment without reference to Bagwell’s claims.3
This paper argues that in a wide range of economic environments, acces-
sibility may fail, so that the outcome of the game with perfect observation
cannot be approximated by equilibrium outcomes under imperfect observ-
ability. By economic environments, we mean situations where incentives to
commit are inﬂuenced by the prices chosen by other agents.4 One speciﬁc
class of games where our results apply is leader-follower games that are played
in a contracting environment. A second example that we consider is the in-
teraction between a strategic buyer, who seeks to commit to certain decisions
today in order to inﬂuence her terms of trade tomorrow, and the sellers who
quote prices to her. Our main ﬁnding is that an accessible outcome fails to
the outcome is close to Stakelberg when the noise is small.
2Not all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are accessible, even with generic pay-
oﬀs — see the example in [5]. A similar result is obtained in ﬁnitely repeated games with
imperfect private monitoring — Bhaskar and van Damme [3] show that eﬃcient equilib-
rium outcomes under perfect monitoring may not be accessible with imperfect private
monitoring.
3Since mixed equilibria can be puriﬁed by adding private payoﬀ shocks (see Maggi [7]),
commitment power can be restored even in pure strategy equilibrium.
4Since prices maybe chosen from a continuum, the results of Guth et. al. do not apply
in our context.
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exist under very general conditions. The failure of accessibility arises since
mixed strategy equilibria in these economic environments have to satisfy a
generalized indiﬀerence principle – not only must the player randomizing be-
tween two actions be indiﬀerent between these actions, those quoting prices
to him must also be so indiﬀerent. So the contribution of this paper is to
re-instate the Bagwell critique, for a speciﬁc class of games.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets
out a simple entry deterrence example, which illustrates our basic point of
the failure of accessibility. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium outcomes
of leader follower games in a contracting environment, when there is perfect
observation of the leaders’ actions. Section 4 has our main results, when
there is noisy observation in leader follower games. Section 5 presents an
example, of a strategic buyer, that illustrates the more general economic
contexts where our point applies. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 An Entry Deterrence Example
The basic point of our paper is made most simply by considering the following
example of an entry-deterrence game, in Fig. 1. The leader is the incumbent
ﬁrm can choose whether or not to incur a costly investment. The entrant
observes whether investment is made (I) not (N), and decides whether to
stay out or enter.
I, the act of investment on the part of the incumbent, requires the pur-
chase of equipment. We shall assume initially that the investment good is
purchased in a competitive market at cost price c, i.e. p = c. v > c, so that
the backward induction outcome has the incumbent choosing I while the
entrant stays out. This simple game illustrates the value of commitment —
the incumbent invests only in order to deter entry.
Bagwell [1] has argued that the slightest amount of imperfect observation
undermines the commitment power of the incumbent. Suppose that when
the incumbent chooses I, the entrant observes the signal i with probability
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Figure 1: The Entry Deterrence Game
1 − ε, and the signal n with probability ε. If the incumbent chooses N, the
entrant observes n with probability 1−η and i with probability η. Then there
cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium where the incumbent chooses I with
probability one. The only pure strategy equilibrium is where the incumbent
does not invest, and the entrant enters irrespective of his signal.
However, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where the incumbent
invests with probability θ close to one (θ solves θε
θε+(1−θ)(1−η) =
1
2
, so that the
entrant believes that investment has taken place with probability one-half
on observing n). The entrant stays out if he observes the signal i, and if
he observes n, he enters with probability γ. The incumbent’s payoﬀ from
investing equals
U(I, ρ) = (v − γε)− p. (1)
Whereas his payoﬀ from not investing is
U(N, ρ) = [(1− γ)(1− η) + η] v. (2)
Equating these payoﬀs yields γ = p
v(1−η−ε) . Note that
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θ =
1− η
1− η − ε, (3)
so that the probability of investment converges to 1 as ε → 0. Since
the entrant stays out whenever he observes i, the outcome (I,OUT) occurs
with a probability that tends to one as ε → 0. This is an example of the
result in van Damme and Hurkens [4], that in any game with one leader and
one follower and generic payoﬀs, the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome
is always accessible.
We now consider the implications of this game being played in a con-
tracting environment. Let us assume that there is a monopoly supplier of
equipment, whose cost of production is c. The game in the contracting envi-
ronment, Γ˜, is as follows. The supplier chooses a price, p, that is quoted to
the incumbent. This is observed by the incumbent alone, who then chooses
his action. The entrant observes the incumbent’s action and chooses his own
action. This game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as follows.
The supplier chooses p = v. The incumbent chooses I if and only if p ≤ v,
and chooses N otherwise. The entrant stays out if he observes I and enters
if he observes N. Note that in this equilibrium, the supplier earns a proﬁt of
v− c, and the action proﬁle (I,OUT) is played with probability one – we call
this the outcome of the equilibrium. Call the outcome of this equilibrium the
Stackelberg outcome — the incumbent invests, buying equipment at price v,
and the entrant stays out. Observe that the action proﬁle played in this equi-
librium coincides with that played when investment good is purchased on a
competitive market; however, the monopoly supplier earns proﬁts that equal
his marginal contribution to the incumbent’s payoﬀ at this equilibrium.
Now let us assume that the investment decision is observed only imper-
fectly. Recall that the prices quoted by the incumbent’s suppliers are not
observed by the entrant. We claim that there is no equilibrium with an
outcome that is close to the Stackelberg outcome. An equilibrium outcome
of the game with noisy observation consists of an (expected) proﬁt for the
supplier and a probability distribution over player action proﬁles, i.e. it is
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an element of Euclidean space. So more precisely, if we let ε→ 0, there does
not exist a sequence of equilibria of the associated games Γ˜(ε), the outcome
of which converges to the Stackelberg outcome in the Euclidean metric. Let
ε > 0 and assume that there is an equilibrium where the incumbent chooses I
with high probability, and where the supplier chooses any price p > c. Note
ﬁrst in such an equilibrium, the incumbent cannot invest with probability
one, for the same reason as in the original Bagwell argument. For in this
case, the entrant will stay out regardless of the signal, and the incumbent
would therefore prefer not to invest. So let us assume that the outcome is
such that incumbent plays both I and N with positive probability. Let the
total probability that N is played be α. Consider ﬁrst the case where the
supplier does not randomize, and let p > c be the supplier’s price chosen, so
that his payoﬀ is
(p− c)(1− α). (4)
We now show that α > 0 implies that p cannot be optimal for supplier
A, for he can do better by choosing p′ < p, where p′ is arbitrarily close to
p. If he chooses any price less than p, then we claim that the incumbent will
choose to invest with probability one. To verify this, inspect the expressions
for (1) and (2) — since the two are equal at p, it follows that the former
will be strictly greater when p′ < p. It follows that the supplier can earn
(p′ − c) for any p′ < p, which will exceed (p − c)(1 − α) for p suﬃciently
close to p. Hence there cannot exist an equilibrium with outcome close to the
Stackelberg outcome, i.e. with p close to v,and where the incumbent invests
with probability close to one.
It remains to consider the case where the supplier randomizes across
prices. Suppose that he chooses p, p′ with positive probability, where p > p′.
At p, the incumbent must invest with positive probability, since otherwise
the supplier’s payoﬀ is zero. The argument of the previous paragraph implies
that at p′, the incumbent invests with probability one. But then the supplier
can choose p′′ such that p > p′′ > p′, and the incumbent will still invest
with probability one, implying that p′ cannot be optimal. We have therefore
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shown that for any ε > 0, there does not exist an equilibrium where invest-
ment occurs with positive probability, and where the supplier chooses a price
which is greater than c. Since supplier proﬁts equal v − c in the Stackelberg
outcome with perfect observability, this outcome is not accessible, since it
cannot be approximated in the game with imperfect observation.
This example does not rely upon the supplier having complete monopoly
power over the supply of the investment good, it only requires that there is
some monopoly power. Suppose that there is a second supplier for the same
good, whose cost of production where v > c′ > c. The equilibrium outcome
in the game without noise would have p = c′−c, so that the eﬃcient supplier
makes positive proﬁts. 5 However, in the game with noisy observation where
investment takes place, the incumbent must randomize, so positive proﬁts
for the supplier are inconsistent with equilibrium.
The above argument makes clear that in any equilibrium where the in-
cumbent randomizes between I and N, the supplier must also be indiﬀerent
between these actions, i.e. the supplier’s price must equal marginal cost c.
There does exist such an equilibrium — the supplier quotes p = c, and the
incumbent randomizes between I and N at this price.6 In such an equilib-
rium, the incumbent’s payoﬀ is approximately v− c when the noise is small,
which is strictly greater than his payoﬀ under perfect observability, 0. In this
equilibrium, the incumbent appropriates the supplier proﬁts, which he can-
not do under perfect observability. In other words, if incumbent retains his
commitment power under imperfect observation, he also enhances his power
vis-a-vis his supplier, and captures all the surplus.
5This is true in any cautious equilibrium, where the ineﬃcient supplier does not choose
price below c′.
6The precise continuation strategies for the strategies of the incumbent and entrant are
as given in equations [1]-[3], with p = c. If the supplier deviates and chooses p > c, the
incumbent chooses N for sure.
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2.1 A game where the leader has no incentive to devi-
ate
The entry deterrence game is a classic instance of a game where commitment
is important – the incumbent ﬁrm has no incentive to invest except in order to
deter entry. However, the failure of accessibility also applies when the leader
has no incentive to deviate from his subgame perfect equilibrium action in
the underlying game. Our second example, in Fig. 2, illustrates this. Assume
that x < 2 and x = 1, so that the underlying game has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium.

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Figure 2: Leader has no incentive to deviate, x < 2.
Consider the game of Fig. 2. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is
(T, L). Since this is a Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game, it is
also a pure strategy equilibrium outcome of the game with noisy observation.
Now consider the game played in a contracting environment where player 1,
the leader, requires to contract with a monopoly supplier, supplier T, in order
to play T. None of the other actions of either player need contracting with a
supplier. With perfect observation of the leader’s action, the price charged by
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this supplier, p(T ), must equal 1, the diﬀerence between the leader’s payoﬀ at
(T, L) and (B,R). However, with imperfect observation, the outcome where
(T, L) and supplier T makes a proﬁt of 1 is not accessible. In any equilibrium
where T is played with probability one, we must have p(T ) = 2−x, since the
follower will play L irrespective of the signal that he observes. On the other
hand, if the leader randomizes, p(T ) = 0 for the same reasons as in the entry
deterrence example. Thus we have a failure of accessibility in this example
as well, as long as x = 1.
The basic characteristic of this example is that the leader’s action is
relevant to the follower, in the sense that the follower’s best response varies
depending on whether T or B is played). This condition, in conjunction with
supplier monopoly power, is suﬃcient to ensure failure of accessibility.
2.2 Robustness: Discrete Prices
Why is there a failure of accessibility? Our example, of a game played in a
contracting environment are clearly not generic extensive form game, in the
sense of Guth et. al. [5]— the game is not ﬁnite, since prices are chosen from
a continuum. Assume now that prices must be chosen from a discrete grid.
More precisely, each supplier must choose a price pi from the set { km : k = 0 or
k ∈ N}, where m ∈ N indexes the ﬁneness of the grid. The noisy game Γ˜ can
now be parameterized by the pair (ε,m) where ε is the noise in observation
and m is the grid size. We shall demonstrate two results. First, for any
given level of noise parameterized by ε, there exists a grid size m(ε) such
that the limit perfect equilibrium outcomes in the sequence of games Γ˜(ε,m)
(ε > 0,m ≥ m(ε)) as ε → 0 and m → ∞ are disjoint from the limit
perfect equilibrium outcomes in the sequence of noiseless games Γ˜(0,m) as
m → ∞. However, if we ﬁx the grid size at some m¯, this discontinuity does
not appear, i.e. there exists a perfect equilibrium outcome of Γ˜(0, m¯) which
is a limit of a sequence of perfect equilibrium outcomes of the games Γ˜(ε, m¯)
as ε → 0. This latter result is not implied by the results of Guth et. al. [5]
since homogeneous good Bertrand competition with discrete prices is not a
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generic game — there are ties in payoﬀs at the terminal nodes of the game
tree, so long as both suppliers must choose from the same grid of prices.7
It will be expositionally convenient to assume that the payoﬀ v in Fig. 1
is an irrational number. Given the price grid m, let p∗(m) be the largest price
that is less than v, and let the grid be suﬃciently ﬁne that p∗(m) > c. Let us
now characterize perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in the game where
the incumbent’s action is perfectly observed. Clearly, in any equilibrium
outcome, the incumbent will invest with probability one and entrant will stay
out with probability one. If the supplier chooses the price p∗(m), then he
sells with probability one, since v > p∗(m). Thus the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium has the supplier making proﬁts p∗(m) − c, with (I,OUT) being
played with probability one.
Now let us consider the situation where commitment is imperfectly ob-
served. Fix an equilibrium of the game Γ˜(ε,m), where I is played by the
incumbent with positive probability, and let pˆ(m) be the largest price, that
is chosen by the supplier in this equilibrium. Clearly, at pˆ(m) the incumbent
must buy with positive probability, since otherwise pˆ will not be chosen by
the supplier. Since it is optimal for the incumbent to buy at pˆ, it must be
strictly optimal to buy at any price strictly below pˆ. Hence the supplier can
ensure the payoﬀ of pˆ(m) − 1
m
by choosing the price pˆ(m) − 1
m
. If α is the
probability that the incumbent buys at price pˆ, we must have that
αpˆ(m) ≥ pˆ(m)− 1
m
. (5)
Let β be the probability that the supplier’s price equals pˆ. Hence the total
probability that the incumbent does not invest equals
β(1− α) ≤ 1− α ≤ 1
pˆ(m)m
. (6)
If the grid of prices is suﬃciently ﬁne, then m is large and the right hand
side above will be close to zero unless pˆ(m) is also small. However, the total
7For example, one can show that such a game will have a continuum of perfect equi-
librium outcomes as long as the grid of prices is suﬃciently ﬁne.
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probability that the incumbent does not invest must equal 1− θ, where θ is
given by 3. Therefore,
pˆ(m) ≤ 1− η − ε
εm
. (7)
We have therefore proved the following:
1. For any ε > 0, there exists m∗(ε) such that if we consider the sequence
of games Γ˜(ε,m(ε)) where ε → 0 and m(ε) ≥ m∗(ε), the Stackelberg
outcome is not accessible.
2. If we ﬁx m, and consider the sequence Γ˜(ε,m) where ε→ 0, the Stack-
elberg outcome is accessible.
To interpret this statement, consider an example where c = 0, and v
= £100 + ξ, where ξ is a tiny irrational number. The supplier makes a
proﬁt of £100 when commitment is perfectly observed. In the game with
noisy observation, suppose that the probability of the incumbent does not
invest (1− θ) must equal ε in order to make the entrant indiﬀerent between
entering and staying out when she observes n. If the price grid is in pennies,
then the supplier will have no incentive to reduce price below £100 only if
(1 − ε)100 ≥ 99.99, i.e. ε must be smaller than 0.0001. In other words, if
the proﬁts that the supplier makes are large relative to the minimum unit of
account, the noise must be very small indeed.
The remainder of the paper sets out how the insight contained in these ex-
amples generalize. Our ﬁrst task, in section 3, is to provide a characterization
of equilibrium outcomes in leader-follower games played in a contracting en-
vironment, where the followers’ have perfect observation of leaders’ actions.
In section 4, we will consider how noisy observation results in a failure of
accessibility quite generally.
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3 Perfect observation
We consider a leader-follower game played in a contracting environment,
with perfect observation of the leaders’ commitment. This follows the set up
in Bhaskar [2], although the exposition here is self-contained. We will use
the term player for someone who plays the game in question, and the term
supplier to denote someone with whom a player may need to contract with
in order to be able to adopt some strategy in the game. Among the players,
we will distinguish between the set of leaders, L = {1, 2, ...,m} and the set of
followers, F = {m+1, ..., n}. I = L∪F is the set of players, and each player
i has a ﬁnite action set Ai, whose generic element will also be denoted by a
j
i
or ai. Let A = ×i∈IAi be the set of action proﬁles, and let gi : A→ R be the
gross payoﬀ of player i. These gross payoﬀs at the proﬁle a = (ai)i∈I will in
general diﬀer from the usual (net) payoﬀs of a player since she may have to
contract with a supplier in order to be able to play the action ai. Let A¯i ⊂ Ai
be the set of actions for which the player needs a supplier. For any player i
and any action aji ∈ A¯i , let Σij = {ij1, ..., ijmij} denote the set of competing
suppliers – the player needs to contract with exactly one of these suppliers in
order to take action aji . The h−th supplier, ijh, has a cost of supply, cijh. Let
ij1 index the eﬃcient supplier for action ij, that is the one with the lowest
cost. We will also use the notation φ(ij) to denote the eﬃcient supplier for
action ij. Σi = ∪j∈A¯iΣj denotes the set of suppliers for player i. Let pijh
denote the price which is charged by supplier ijh for enabling the action a
j
i ,
and let pij = (pijh)ijh∈Σij , and pi = (pij)j∈A¯i . If a
j
i /∈ A¯i we set the price of
this action, pij, to zero. The net payoﬀ at the proﬁle a = (a
j
i , a−i) where a−i
is the vector of actions of players h = i, and player i contracts with supplier
ijh, is given by
ui(a, pi) = gi(a
j
i , a−i)− pijh. (8)
The payoﬀ to supplier ijh is given by pijh − cijh, where cijh is the cost
of producing the input required for this action. If the player does not play
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action aji , the payoﬀ to any supplier of this action is zero. Let us normalize
prices and gross payoﬀs by measuring them net of the minimum cost of supply
(equal to cij1 for any action ij), so that a zero price corresponds to pricing at
minimum cost. Henceforth, the gross payoﬀ gi(ai, a−i) will denote the payoﬀ
when player pays the minimum cost of action ai. We extend, in the usual
way, the gross payoﬀ function gi to correlated action proﬁles: gi(α) is the
payoﬀ to player i when α ∈ Δ(A) is the vector of correlated actions played.
The leader-follower game with private contracts, Γ, is as follows:
1. Each supplier in ΣL = ∪i∈LΣi quotes a price for each input that he
supplies.
2. Each leader i ∈ L observes the price vector pi (but not the prices
quoted to other players), and chooses an action.
3. Each supplier in ΣF = ∪i∈FΣi observes the action proﬁle aL chosen by
the leaders and chooses her price.
4. Each follower i ∈ F observes aL and her own price vector pi, and
followers simultaneously choose actions.
We make the following assumptions regarding the game Γ.
Assumption A1. (No Complementary Inputs): For any player i and any
action aji , no more than one supplier is required.
Assumption A2. For every player i there exists an action a0i such that no
input is required to play this action.
This assumption ensures that the minimum payoﬀ that any player in I
can receive is bounded and given by mina−i gi(a
0
i , a−i).
Assumption A3. A supplier supplies at most one player, i.e. Σi and Σj
are disjoint if i = j.
This assumption plays an essential role in our analysis of private contracts,
since it ensures that the beliefs of player i regarding the actions chosen by
other players do not vary with the prices that player i is quoted by her
supplier.
Assumption A4. A supplier supplies at most one action of any player,
i.e. ∀i, Σij and Σik are disjoint if j = k.
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Deﬁne c˜ij = minijh∈Σijh,h =1{cijh}. c˜ij =∞ if φ(ij) is a monopoly supplier.
Assumption A5. For any player i and action aji ∈ A¯i ⊂ Ai, c˜ij > 0 .
A5 states that eﬃcient supplier has some monopoly power, and is made
for expositional convenience. It is without essential loss of generality – if
there is more than one eﬃcient supplier for an action, then in any equilibrium
where this action is played, the price must equal zero, and this is equivalent
to assuming that this action does not belong to A¯i.
We will restrict attention to perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game Γ.
Beliefs of the players are given by Bayes rule along the equilibrium path.
If a supplier deviates, then assumption A3 implies that this does not aﬀect
the beliefs of a player to whom this price applies, i.e. her beliefs about the
actions of other players are unaﬀected. In addition, we want to rule out
“unreasonable equilibria”, where inactive suppliers (i.e. those who do not
make a sale) choose strictly negative prices. Such equilibria are sometimes
called cautious, and can be ruled out by considerations of trembling hand
perfection.8 So henceforth, by “equilibrium” we mean a cautious perfect
Bayesian equilibrium where all supplier prices are non-negative.
A pure strategy for a supplier ijh (for action aji ) is a price pijh ∈ R+. A
mixed strategy is a probability measure πijh on R+. A strategy for leader i
is a map σi : R
|Σi| → Δ(Ai). A pure strategy for supplier ijh, who supplies
a follower’s action aji , is a map ρijh : AL → R+, while a mixed strategy
ρ˜ijh speciﬁes a probability measure on R+ for every aL ∈ AL. A strategy
for follower j is a map σj : R
|Σj | × AL → Δ(Aj). A strategy proﬁle σ is a
collection ((πijh)ijh∈ΣL , (σi)i∈L, (ρ˜ijh)ijh∈ΣF , (σj)j∈F ).
In usual terminology, the outcome of a strategy proﬁle σ is the induced
8Simon and Stinchcombe [11] set out reﬁnements for continuum normal form games,
but there are no universally accepted reﬁnements for continuum extensive form games.
However, we can discretize the price space, and consider trembling hand perfect equilibria
of the discretized game. We may restrict attention to equilibria of the continuum game
which are limit points of a sequence of trembling hand equilibria of discrete games as
the grid of prices becomes increasingly ﬁner. It is easy to see that any equilibrium with
negative prices will not be a limit of such trembling hand perfect equilibria.
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distribution over the terminal nodes of the game tree. In price setting games,
the set of equilibrium outcomes usually contains considerable redundancy.
For example, in the case of Bertrand competition between three ﬁrms with
diﬀering unit costs, the price set by the highest cost ﬁrm is irrelevant, and
can therefore be chosen arbitrarily. It will be therefore be more useful to
focus on a reﬁnement of the set of outcomes. The action outcome associated
with a strategy proﬁle is the induced distribution over the set of player-action
proﬁles, A. The supplier payoﬀs associated with σ are simply the payoﬀs to
the suppliers under this proﬁle. For the purposes of this paper, the outcome
of a strategy proﬁle is deﬁned as the pair consisting of the action outcome
and the supplier payoﬀs, and is an element of Euclidean space.
Our results will relate the equilibrium action outcomes in Γ˜, the leader
follower game in a contracting environment to those in a standard leader-
follower game. This is the leader-follower game Γ where all supplier prices
are exogenously ﬁxed at zero (i.e. all inputs are supplied at cost) and players
net payoﬀs equal their gross payoﬀs. A strategy for a leader in Γ is a mixed
action αi ∈ Δ(Ai), while a follower’s strategy is a map βj : AL → Δ(Aj).
Let EΓ denote the set of subgame perfect equilibria of Γ. The outcome of a
strategy proﬁle (αL, βF ) is the induced distribution over the elements of A.
Let ΩΓ ⊂ Δ(A) denote the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of
the game Γ. Given aL ∈ AL, let EΓ(aL) denote the set of Nash equilibria in the
subgame that results following the play of aL. Let αL = (αi)i∈L, βF = (βi)i∈F ,
and let (αL, βF ) ∈ EΓ. Given an vector a = (ai)ni=1, we use the notation a\a′i
to denote the vector that results when the i-th component ai is replaced by
a′i.Given aL ∈ AL, if follower i’s continuation βi(aL) is a pure action, we
deﬁne follower i’s deviation loss δi(aL, βF ) as :
δi(aL, βF ) = gi(aL, βF (aL))− max
ai =βi(aL)
gi(aL, βF (aL)\ai). (9)
That is, δi(αL, βF ) is follower i’s loss from choosing his next best action
rather than the recommendation of the equilibrium. 9 If βi(aL) is a mixed,
9In the game Γ˜, if a supplier is required for taking action βi(aL), δi(aL, βF ) can be
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δi(αL, βF ) = 0.
Consider now a leader, i ∈ L. If the leader plays a pure action aˆi as part
of the equilibrium (αL, βF ), we deﬁne his deviation loss δi(αL, βF ) as :
δi(αL, βF ) = gi(αL, βF (aL))−max
ai =aˆi
gi(aL\ai, βF (aL\ai)). (10)
If the leader plays a mixed action, δi(αL, βF ) = 0.
Let ΩΓ˜ denote the set of equilibrium action outcomes of the game Γ˜, i.e.
the actions played by the leader and follower in a cautious perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the game Γ˜.
Proposition 1 ΩΓ˜ = ΩΓ i.e. the cautious perfect Bayesian equilibrium ac-
tion outcomes of Γ˜ coincide with the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes
of Γ. In any equilibrium of Γ˜ with action outcome (aL, βF (aL)), an active
supplier for player i earns his marginal contribution min{δi(aL, βF (aL)), c˜ij}.
Proof: While this proposition may be proved more succinctly by an ap-
plication of theorem 1 in Bhaskar [2] and an induction argument, we present
the complete argument here for the reader’s convenience. We show ﬁrst the
correspondence between equilibrium action outcomes in the two games in the
second stage, when the followers choose their actions. Let aL be an arbitrary
action proﬁle chosen by the leaders. In the game Γ˜, the continuation game
that follows the choice of aL is a game of imperfect information, since the
prices chosen by the suppliers in stage 1 are not observed by either the fol-
lowers or their suppliers. Nevertheless, these prices are payoﬀ irrelevant, and
the only payoﬀ relevant variable, (aL), is commonly observed by all followers
and their suppliers. In the game Γ, let E(aL) denote the set of Nash equilib-
ria in the subgame following the play of aL, and let β(aL) ∈ E(aL). We show
ﬁrst that in the game Γ˜, there exists an equilibrium where, following the play
of aL in stage one, β(aL) is played by the followers and every supplier of a
follower earns his marginal contribution. If follower i plays a pure action at
thought of as the marginal contribution of this supplier to the follower’s payoﬀ at this
subgame perfect equilibrium.
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β(aL), let the most eﬃcient supplier for this action choose a price equal to his
marginal contribution, δi(aL, β(aL)), while all other suppliers in Σi choose a
price of zero. If follow i randomizes at β(aL), then let every supplier in Σi
choose a price of zero. Let each follower i play βi(aL) if no active supplier
deviates, and play any best response action otherwise.
We now show that in any equilibrium of Γ˜, the action outcome follow-
ing the choice of aL by the leaders is an element of E(aL). Fix an equi-
librium of Γ˜, and consider the decisions of follower i and his suppliers.
From the point of view of these agents, aL is given, and the strategies
of the suppliers of other followers and the strategies of the followers, in-
duce a mixed action proﬁle, α−i ∈ ×j∈F,j =iΔ(Aj). Furthermore, by as-
sumption A3, the player i’s beliefs about the proﬁle played by other fol-
lowers do not change with the prices charged by i’s suppliers. So our re-
sults follow from standard results on Bertrand competition between asym-
metric sellers and a single buyer. Let aji ∈ argmaxai gi(ai, α−i, aL), and
let aki ∈ argmaxai =aji gi(ai, α−i, aL) be the next best action. Consider ﬁrst
the case where gi(a
j
i , α−i, aL) > gi(a
k
i , α−i, aF ). In this case, we show that
aji must be played with probability one, and supplier φ(a
j
i ) must earn a
payoﬀ δi(a
j
i , α−i, aF ) in any cautious equilibrium. By choosing a price
δi(a
j
i , α−i, aF )−ε, φ(aji ) can ensure a sale with probability one, since the prices
of other suppliers are non-negative, and thus his payoﬀ must be no less than
δi(a
j
i , α−i, aF ) . If his payoﬀ is strictly greater than δi(a
j
i , α−i, aF ), then the
support of φ(aji ) ’s mixed strategy must consist of prices strictly greater than
δi(a
j
i , α−i, aF ), and φ(a
k
i ) can also earn positive proﬁts. Thus in any mixed
strategy equilibrium suppliers φ(aji ) and φ(a
k
i ) must both earn positive prof-
its. By assumption A2, the prices of the two sellers must also be bounded,
by [gi(a
j
i , α−i, aF ) − gi(a0, α−i, aF )] and [gi(aki , α−i, aF ) − gi(a0, α−i, aF )] re-
spectively (recall that a0 is the action that does not require any supplier).
We now show that at least one seller’s mixed strategy has in its support a
price that earns zero proﬁts, contradicting our earlier result that each seller
earns positive proﬁts. Let x(φ(aji )) (resp. x(φ(a
k
i ))) denote the supremum
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of prices that lie in the support of φ(aji )’s (resp. φ(a
k
i ) mixed strategy. If
x(φ(aji )) > x(φ(a
k
i ))+ δi(a
j
i , α−i, aL), then φ(a
j
i ) chooses a price which makes
zero proﬁts, while if the inequality is reversed, this is the case for φ(aki ). If
both expressions are equal, then both sellers must choose a price which makes
zero proﬁts, unless each player’s mixed strategy has an atom at the supre-
mum. But in this case, a player can do strictly better by choosing a price
ε below the supremum, where ε is suﬃciently small. We conclude therefore
that if aji is the unique maximizer element of argmaxai gi(ai, α−i, aL), then it
must be played with probability one, and φ(aji ) earns his marginal contribu-
tion. Similar arguments establish that if argmaxai gi(ai, α−i, aL) has several
elements, then the player’s mixed strategy can only assign probability to one
of these, and the prices must equal zero. We have therefore established that
following the play of aL in stage 1, each player must assign positive proba-
bility only to actions that maximize his gross payoﬀs, given any the induced
beliefs over the actions of other players. Thus the action outcome of must
be an element of E(aL), and supplier payoﬀs are as in the statement of the
theorem.
We now proceed to the ﬁrst stage of the game Γ˜. Given any action pro-
ﬁle aL chosen by the leaders, gross payoﬀs to any leader i are given by
gi(aL, β(aL)) where β(aL) ∈ EΓ(aL). Thus any equilibrium strategy proﬁle of
the followers deﬁnes a strategic form game for the leaders played in a con-
tracting environment, and applying the theorem again, the actions chosen
by the leaders must constitute a Nash equilibrium. Finally, the payoﬀ loss to
any leader from choosing his best deviant action or an alternative supplier is
min{δi(aL, βF (aL)), c˜ij}, which speciﬁes the payoﬀ to each active supplier to
a leader.
The above proposition establishes the following: given any subgame per-
fect equilibrium of the game Γ, there is associated a unique outcome ω of
the game Γ˜, since the supplier payoﬀs are uniquely deﬁned by their marginal
contributions.
Remark 1 Since the proof is based on induction over two stages, the propo-
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sition can be generalized as follows. Consider an arbitrary ﬁnite multistage
game Γ with observed actions, with ﬁnitely many actions, players and stages.
Now embed Γ in a contracting environment, resulting in the game Γ˜, where
in each stage, the suppliers involved choose prices after having observed the
actions played in previous stages. The equilibrium distributions over players
actions in the games Γ˜ and Γ coincide.
This proposition has the following corollary. Consider a game Γ with one
leader and one follower. For generic payoﬀs, the game Γ has a unique back-
wards induction equilibrium in pure strategies, that we denote by (a∗1, β
∗
2),
where a∗1 is the leader’s action, and β
∗
2 is the follower’s best response .
The action proﬁle played in this equilibrium is denoted by (a∗1, a
∗
2), where
a∗2 = β
∗(a∗1). Now for generic payoﬀs, δ1(a
∗
1, β
∗
2), the deviation loss suﬀered
by the leader at the unique equilibrium, is strictly positive, as is that of the
follower. We have therefore that:
Corollary 2 Any one-leader one-follower game Γ˜ with generic payoﬀs has a
unique equilibrium action outcome. If a supplier is required for the leader (or
follower) to take his equilibrium action, this supplier makes strictly positive
proﬁts.
4 The noisy leader- follower game
We now assume that the leaders’ action proﬁle is observed with some noise:
given that akL ∈ AL is chosen by the leader, nature chooses signal ahL ∈ AL
with probability λhk. λ is a stochastic matrix deﬁned on AL × AL. Let Λ be
the set of possible signal structures, and Int(Λ) be the set of signal structures
with full support, i.e. the set of λ such that λhk > 0 ∀ hk. Let λ0 denote the
identity matrix – this corresponds to perfect observation. The game Γ˜(λ) is
deﬁned as follows:
1. Each supplier in ΣL quotes a price for each input that he supplies.
2. Each leader i ∈ L observes the price vector pi, and chooses an action.
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3. Given the action proﬁle chosen by the leaders, nature chooses a signal
in AL, according to the stochastic matrix λ. The signal is observed by agents
in ΣF ∪ F.
4. Each supplier in ΣF quotes a price for each input that he supplies.
5. Each follower i observes the price vector pi and followers simultaneously
choose actions.
The gross payoﬀs to players depend only on action proﬁle realized, and
not upon the signal. As before, net payoﬀs to players are equal to gross
payoﬀs minus the prices paid.
Note that all agents have exactly the same strategy sets in the games Γ˜
and Γ˜(λ) – only the payoﬀs associated with strategy proﬁles diﬀer in the two
games. We restrict attention to cautious perfect Bayesian equilibria of the
game Γ˜(λ). Fix an equilibrium of the game Γ˜(λ). The action outcome of an
equilibrium is the element of Δ(A) induced by the equilibrium. The outcome
of an equilibrium is the pair consisting of the action outcome and the proﬁle
of supplier payoﬀs. Let Ξ(λ) denote the set of equilibrium outcomes of Γ˜(λ),
and let Ξ(0) denote the set of equilibrium outcomes of Γ˜. Expected supplier
payoﬀs are real numbers, while the player action outcomes are probability
distributions over a ﬁnite set. Thus Ξ(λ) ⊂ R|ΣL∪ΣF | × Δ(A), a subset of
Euclidean space. Since the set of outcomes is a subset of Euclidean space,
we may use the usual norm in order to deﬁne convergence. We say that a
sequence ωn → ω if this convergence is in the usual topology.
Definition 3 ω ∈ Ξ(0) is accessible if ∃ countable sequences (λ, Γ˜(λ), ω(λ)),
ω(λ) ∈ Ξ(λ) with λ ∈ Int(Λ), λ→ λ0 such that Γ˜(λ)→ Γ˜(λ0) and ω(λ)→ ω.
Let us consider the class of games Γ with a subgame perfect equilibrium
(a∗L, βF ), where a
∗
L ∈ AL is a pure action proﬁle. We assume :
Assumption A6: The subgame following the play of a∗L has a unique
equilibrium.
Let us denote the outcome of this equilibrium by (a∗L, α
∗
F ), where α
∗
F =
βF (a
∗
L). Notice that if Γ has one leader and one follower, then generically Γ
has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and therefore satisﬁes A6.
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We now set out the conditions under which accessibility fails.
Definition 4 Leader i ∈ L has an incentive to deviate at (a∗L, α∗F ) if
max
ai
gi(a
∗
L\ai, α∗F ) > gi(a∗L, α∗F ).
This deﬁnition is straightforward – a leader has an incentive to deviate at
a subgame perfect equilibrium if he can increase his payoﬀ, given the choices
of other leaders and given that followers do not respond to this deviation.
In standard leader-follower games outside a contracting environment, the
question of commitment is only relevant if the leader has an incentive to
deviate. Our entry deterrence example belongs to this class. However, our
negative results on accessibility apply to a larger class equilibria, in a larger
class of games.
Definition 5 Leader i’s action is relevant at (a∗L, βF ) if
max
ai =a∗i
gi(a
∗
L\ai, α∗F ) = max
ai =a∗i
[gi(a
∗
L\ai, βF (a∗L\ai)].
Let aˆi ∈ argmaxai =a∗1 gi(a∗L\ai, βF (a∗L\a)). If β(a∗L\aˆi) diﬀers from α∗F ,
then leader i’s action will be relevant (for the followers) at (a∗L, βF ), provided
that payoﬀs are generic. In other words, any game where some follower’s best
response depends upon whether leader i chooses his commitment action a∗i
or deviates (optimally) from this, leader i’s action will be relevant. Clearly,
in any game where the leader has an incentive to deviate, his action will be
relevant, but the converse is not true.
To clarify our deﬁnitions, let us consider a one leader-one follower game,
with a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, (a∗1, β2). Let aˆ1 ∈ argmaxa1 =a∗1 g1(a1, a∗2),
where a∗2 = β2(a
∗
1). If β2(aˆ1) = a∗2, then the leader’s action will be relevant,
provided that payoﬀs are generic. The game in Fig. 2 (p. 9) provides an illus-
tration: in the (generically unique) subgame perfect equilibrium, the leader
has an incentive to deviate only if x > 2; however, as long as x = 1, the
leader’s action is always relevant.
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Let γi(a
∗
L, α
∗
F ) = gi(a
∗
L, α
∗
F )−maxai =a∗i gi(a∗L\ai, α∗F ) denote the deviation
loss of the leader in the simultaneous move game, where the follower has no
observation of the leader’s action. If γi(a
∗
L, α
∗
F ) = δi(a∗L, βF ), then leader i′s
action is relevant.
Theorem 6 Let Γ be a leader follower game with subgame perfect equilibrium
(a∗L, βF ), with α
∗
F = β(a
∗
L), that satisﬁes A6. Let Γ˜ be the associated game
in a contracting environment, and let ω∗ denote the equilibrium outcome of
Γ˜ that is associated with (a∗L, βF ). If either a) leader i’s action is relevant
at (a∗L, βF ) for some i ∈ L, and there is a monopoly supplier for action a∗i ,
or b) some leader j ∈ L has an incentive to deviate at (a∗L, α∗F ) and needs
to contract with a supplier to take action a∗j , then the outcome ω
∗ is not
accessible.
Proof. From proposition 1, we know that in the game Γ˜, there exists an
equilibrium with p(a∗i ) > 0, with the leaders choosing a
∗
L and the followers
chooses α∗F on observing a
∗
L. Let ω
∗ denote the outcome of this equilibrium.
Consider the noisy game Γ˜(λ) where λ ∈ Int(Λ) is suﬃciently close to λ0 and
suppose that we have an equilibrium with an outcome ω(λ) that is suﬃciently
close to ω∗ where the probability that a∗L is played by the leaders is at least
1− ε and for any action ai played by leader i, the probability that the signal
(a∗L/ai) is observed is at least 1 − ε. Suppose that leader i plays a∗i for sure
in this equilibrium. Then the followers must believe that he has chosen a∗i
irrespective of the signal that is observed. Assumption A6 implies that if
ε is suﬃciently close to zero, the followers must play α∗ after every signal
(a∗L/ai).
Suppose b), so that leader i has an incentive to deviate. In this case,
since the followers play α∗ after every signal (a∗L/ai), there cannot be an
equilibrium where i plays a∗i for sure. Consider next an equilibrium where
the leader randomizes between a∗i and some other action. Since a
∗
i is played
with probability less than one, the equilibrium price p(a∗i ) cannot be strictly
positive, for if this was the case, supplier a∗i has a proﬁtable deviation – by
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reducing his price by any η > 0, he can ensure a sale for sure. Thus in any
such equilibrium, p(a∗i ) = 0, so that the outcome cannot be close to ω
∗.
Suppose a) so that in the noiseless game p(a∗i ) = δi(a
∗
L, βF ). If the leader
chooses a∗i for sure in the noisy game, the followers play α
∗after every signal
(a∗L/ai). So if γi(a
∗
L, α
∗
F ) < δi(a
∗
L, βF ) and p(a
∗
i ) > γi(a
∗
L, α
∗
F ), it is optimal
for the leader to deviate and choose the action a1 ∈ argmaxa1 =a∗1 g1(a1, a∗2),
so that the payoﬀ of supplier a∗i cannot be close to δi(a
∗
L, βF ). Conversely,
if γi(a
∗
L, α
∗
F ) > δi(a
∗
L, βF ) supplier a
∗
i can increase his price to γi(a
∗
L, α
∗
F )
and it will still be optimal for the leader to buy. Thus we cannot have an
equilibrium where a∗i is played with probability one and where supplier p(a
∗
i )
is close to δi(a
∗
L, βF ). Once again, if i randomizes, p(a
∗
i ) = 0, so that the
outcome cannot be close to ω∗.
Having shown that we cannot, in general, approximate the equilibrium
outcomes of the noiseless game Γ˜ when we allow for noise, one may ask
a more limited question. Is it possible to approximate equilibrium action
proﬁles taken by the players in the game, even if one does not approximate
the supplier payoﬀs? Let us consider games Γ with one leader, player 1,
and one follower, player 2. We assume that the gross payoﬀs in the game
satisfy the following genericity assumption:
A7: For any a, a′ ∈ A, a = a′, g1(a) = g1(a′) and g2(a) = g2(a′).
A7 implies that the game Γ has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium,
the outcome of which we denote by a∗ =(a∗1, a
∗
2). By proposition 1, in the
associated game Γ˜ played in a contracting environment, ΩΓ˜ consists of a
singleton set, {a∗}.
Theorem 7 Let Γ be a one-leader one follower game that satisﬁes A7, with
unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome a∗. For any countable sequence
λ→ λ0, λ ∈ Int(Λ) and associated sequence of noisy games Γ˜(λ), there exists
a sequence α˜(λ) ∈ Ω(Γ˜(λ)) such that α˜(λ)→ a∗.
Proof. We consider two separate cases, depending upon whether the
leader has an incentive to deviate or not. Suppose that the leader has no
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incentive to deviate, so that a∗1 ∈ argmaxa1 g1(a1, a∗2). In the noisy game, let
supplier a∗1 choose a price equal to min{γ1(a∗1, a∗2), c˜∗1}, where c˜∗1 denotes the
cost of the next most eﬃcient supplier for a∗1 ( if no supplier is needed for a
∗
1,
set this price equal to zero), and let suppliers for other actions choose a price
of zero. Let the leader choose a∗1, and let the suppliers of the follower and the
follower choose the continuation strategies in Γ˜ (the noiseless) that follow the
play of a∗1, regardless of the signal that is observed – these are clearly optimal
given that a∗1 is played with probability one by the leader, and given that λ
∈ Int(Λ). Given the follower’s behavior, it is optimal for the leader to play
a∗1, since maxa1 =a∗1 g1(a1, a
∗
2) = g1(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) − γ1(a∗1, a∗2) ≤ g1(a∗1, a∗2) − p1(a∗1).
Thus the outcome a∗ is an equilibrium outcome of the noisy game.
Suppose now that the leader has an incentive to deviate at a∗. From
van Damme and Hurkens [4], we know that if A7 is satisﬁed, there exists a
sequence λ→ λ0, λ ∈ Int(Λ) , with an associated sequence of leader-follower
games Γ(λ), such that in each of these games there exists an equilibrium
(α1(λ), β2(λ)), where the outcomes of this sequence of equilibria converge to
a∗. For any λ in this sequence, we shall construct an equilibrium σ(λ) in Γ˜(λ),
the noisy game played in a contracting environment, with the property that
σ(λ) induces the same behavior by the players as (α1(λ), β2(λ)). Consider
Γ˜(λ) and assume that for any signal a1 observed by the followers and their
suppliers, pˆ2(a1) and σ2(a1, pˆ2(a1)) is such that σ2(a1, pˆ2(a1)) = β2(a1, λ).
Assume further that every supplier of the leader chooses a price of zero.
Since α1(λ) is optimal for the leader in Γ(λ), it is also optimal for the leader
to play α1(λ) in Γ˜(λ) since gross payoﬀs are the same in the two games.
Furthermore, given that the leader has an incentive to deviate at a∗, α1(λ)
does not assign probability one to a∗1, i.e. the leader is randomizing between
two or more actions. Thus it is optimal for every seller to choose a price
of zero, since any active seller who increases his price will fail to sell with
probability one.
It remains to verify our assumption that for any signal a1 observed by
the followers and their suppliers, pˆ2(a1) and σ2(a1, pˆ2(a1)) is such that σ2(a1,
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pˆ2(a1)) = β2(a1, λ). This follows from proposition 1, since given any beliefs
over the A1, the continuation game is a (one player) game in a contracting
environment. Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium distributions over
player 2’s actions coincide in the continuation game played in a contracting
environment and the continuation game without contracting being required,
where player 2’s payoﬀs equal his gross payoﬀs. Thus if β2(a1, λ) is optimal
in the latter, there exist optimal supplier prices pˆ2(a1) and σ2(a1, pˆ2(a1))
such that σ2(a1, pˆ2(a1)) = β2(a1, λ).
One interpretation of theorem 7 is that it shows accessibility of equilib-
rium action proﬁles, even if supplier payoﬀs cannot be approximated. Thus
it might be argued that in games played in a contracting environment, im-
perfect observation has distributional consequences, but has no implications
for the actions that are taken. In our view this is not an appropriate interpre-
tation: the payoﬀs to suppliers will have incentive eﬀects and will therefore
aﬀect outcomes in a broader sense.
5 Application: Commitment by a strategic
buyer
We consider an example, and demonstrate the failure of accessibility in a
price setting context. There there is one buyer, indexed C, and two sellers,
A and B. The buyer has a consumption opportunity for one unit of the
product, for each of two periods, t = 1, 2. The valuation of the buyer for the
product is 1 in each period . Each of these buyers has one unit of the product,
and values this at zero. In each period t, each seller with positive inventory
simultaneously quotes the price for a single unit, pti, and the buyer makes
a choice to buy from one or none of the sellers. Let dt ∈ {A,B, ∅} denote
the buyer’s purchase decision, where ∅ denotes the choice of not buying. We
shall assume that the prices chosen by the sellers are private, i.e. they are
not observed by the other seller. However, we may distinguish two distinct
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information structures, public transactions and private transaction. In the
case of public transactions, the buyer’s decision at t = 1, d1, is commonly
observed by both the sellers. In the case of private transactions, the buyer’s
decision is only observed directly by the party with whom the transaction
occurs. As before, our focus is on cautious perfect Bayesian equilibria.
With public transactions, the buyer has substantial commitment power.
Suppose that the buyer chooses not to buy at t = 1. This implies that there
is Bertrand competition in the ﬁnal period, and hence the buyer gets the
product at price 0. It follows, that in any equilibrium, the buyer’s utility is
at least 1. Indeed, the equilibrium payoﬀ set consists of the convex hull of the
points (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 1), where the three components represent
the payoﬀs of A,B and C respectively. Any payoﬀ in this set, say (λA, λB, 1)
can be sustained by the following strategies: at t = 1, both sellers choose
prices equal to zero. The buyer buys from seller i with probability λj, j = i,
as long as neither seller has chosen a price greater than zero. If either buyer
has chosen a price greater than zero, the buyer chooses not to buy. In period
2, there is either Bertrand competition at price zero (if both sellers have
inventory) or one buyer is a monopolist and chooses price equal to one.
Now let us consider the case where transactions are private. That is, if
the buyer chooses A, then A observes this, but B is only sure that the buyer
has not chosen B, i.e. he knows that d1 ∈ {A, ∅}. We may allow for the
possibility that in this case B observes a private signal that is informative
about the buyer’s decision; however, we shall assume that all signals have
positive probability under both decisions.
We show ﬁrst that there exists an equilibrium where the buyer gets utility
0, while the two sellers each get utility 1. Equilibrium strategies are as follows
(if prices are greater than 1, the buyer never buys):
At t = 1 :
p1A = p
1
B = 1.
d1 = A if p1A = p
1
B ≤ 1. d1 = i if p1i < p1j and p1i ≤ 1.
At t = 2 :
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p2i = 1 if d
1 = i,for i = A,B.
d2 = A if p2A = p
2
B ≤ 1. d2 = i if p2i < p2j and p2i ≤ 1.
This equilibrium has the outcome where the buyer buys from A at price
1 at t = 1 and from B at price 1 at t = 2. Since each seller makes his
maximal feasible proﬁt, clearly neither has any incentive to deviate along the
equilibrium path. So consider deviations by the buyer at t = 1. If the buyer
deviates to d1 = ∅, then seller A knows that there has been a deviation, but
seller B does not know that there has been a deviation. Hence B continues
with his equilibrium strategy, and prices at 1 at t = 2. Seller A does not know
whether the buyer has deviated to ∅ or B; however, irrespective of his beliefs,
he knows that he can ensure that the buyer purchases with probability one
as long as he prices strictly below one, and the tie breaking rule embodied
in the buyer’s continuation strategy implies this is also the case if p2A = 1,
regardless of the form of the buyer’s deviation. Hence it is optimal for A to
price at 1, and the buyer’s deviation is unproﬁtable. Similarly, it is easy to
verify that deviating by buying from B at t = 1 is unproﬁtable.
Our main result is the following proposition, showing that the buyer loses
his commitment power in every equilibrium when there is imperfect obser-
vation.
Proposition 8 If transactions are private, the payoﬀ (1, 1, 0) is the unique
equilibrium payoﬀ.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst an equilibrium where the buyer buys with probability
one at t = 1. Fix any such equilibrium where d1 = j with positive probability
along the equilibrium path, and assume that seller i has chosen his equilib-
rium price p1i ; then d
1 = i ⇒ i believes that d1 = j for any signal that he
receives. Hence i will choose the price 1 at t = 2 if the buyer does not buy
from him at t = 1. We show that this implies that p1j = 1. If this is not the
case, and p1j < 1, then j can increase his payoﬀ by choosing p
′ ∈ (p1j , 1). If
the buyer’s equilibrium response to this deviation is to choose d1 = i, then
j will be a monopolist at t = 2, and hence this deviation is beneﬁcial for j.
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Suppose that the buyer’s equilibrium response to j’s deviation is to choose
d1 = ∅. We have established that d1 = i ⇒ i believes that d1 = j for any
signal that he receives, and hence i believes that he is a monopolist at t = 2,
and will choose price 1. j can therefore ensure that the buyer buys from him
at t = 2 by choosing any price p2j < 1, and thus he has a proﬁtable deviation.
We conclude that in any equilibrium where the buyer buys with probability
one at t = 1, he pays a price of 1, and he also buys with probability one at
t = 2, also at a price of 1.
Consider next a candidate equilibrium where the buyer fails to buy with
probability one at t = 1. Hence the price of both ﬁrms at t = 2 equals zero.
Suppose now that A oﬀers a price p1A < 1. The buyer will certainly buy, since
this gives him positive utility and does not aﬀect his continuation value, since
seller B cannot observe this deviation. Hence there cannot be an equilibrium
where the buyer fails to buy with probability one at t = 1.
Finally, we consider the class of candidate equilibria where the buyer
randomizes between buying and not buying at t = 1. Consider ﬁrst an equi-
librium where d1 = ∅ with probability θ and d1 = A with probability 1− θ,
and where A’s price at t = 1 is p1A. Write V
2
i (d
1 = x) for the expected con-
tinuation value of agent i (i ∈ (A,B,C)) conditional on the buyer’s decision
d1 = x (x ∈ {A,B, ∅}). Since the buyer must be indiﬀerent between buying
and not buying, we must have
1− p1A = V 2C(d1 = ∅)− V 2C(d1 = A). (11)
Furthermore, if A charges any price less than p1A, the buyer will strictly
prefer to buy. Hence A must also be indiﬀerent between making a sale in
period two at price p1A and making a sale at t = 1 in competition with seller
B, i.e.
p1A = V
2
A(d = ∅). (12)
Adding these expressions we obtain
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V 2C(d
1 = ∅) + V 2A(d1 = ∅)− V 2C(d1 = A) = 1. (13)
However, since the total available value at t = 2 is 1, this implies that
V 2C(d
1 = A) = 0 (and also V 2B(d
1 = ∅) = 0). However V 2C(d1 = A) = 0 implies
p2B = 1.
However, p2B = 1 is inconsistent with an equilibrium where d
1 = ∅ with
probability θ > 0; in the event that d1 = ∅, A can ensure himself of a payoﬀ
arbitrarily close to 1 in period 2 by choosing a price 1− ε. Hence equilibrium
requires that A also choose a price of 1 at t = 2, and that the buyer buys from
A when pA = pB = 1. However, this implies that p
2
B = 1 is not optimal for
B, since he does better by choosing a price slightly below 1 thereby making
a sale for sure. Thus we cannot have such an equilibrium where the buyer
randomizes between d1 = ∅ and d1 = A.
Finally we consider an equilibrium where the buyer randomizes between
d1 = ∅, d1 = A and d1 = B. In this case, in addition to the above expressions,
one similarly also obtains
V 2C(d
1 = ∅) + V 2B(d1 = ∅)− V 2C(d1 = B) = 1, (14)
which implies that V 2C(d
1 = ∅) = 1, so that at least one seller’s price must
be zero at t = 2 if the buyer does not buy from this seller. However we
also have V 2C(d
1 = A) = 0 and V 2C(d
1 = B) = 0, which is inconsistent with
this, and hence we cannot have an equilibrium where the buyer randomizes
between all three decisions.
This application shows a sharp discontinuity between imperfect monitor-
ing of transactions, and perfect monitoring. Whereas the buyer must get a
payoﬀ of at least one when his transaction (i.e. his commitment) is perfectly
observed, he must get zero when his transaction is imperfectly observed.
That is, he loses his commitment power entirely. The key to this example is
that the pricing decisions of the sellers inﬂuence the terms on which the buyer
makes his commitment. In any equilibrium where the buyer randomizes be-
tween buying and not buying, the sellers must also be indiﬀerent between his
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actions and this turns out to be impossible.
6 Conclusion
We have already discussed the literature on imperfectly observed commit-
ment in the introduction to this paper. A related class of games, introduced
by Va´rdy [12], is leader-follower games with costly observation, where the
follower must pay a small cost in the event that she chooses to observe the
leader’s action. Va´rdy shows that the Stackelberg outcome of a generic ﬁnite
one leader - one follower game, where the follower automatically observes the
leader’s action, can be approximated by the mixed equilibrium outcome of
the game with costly observation (this requires a modiﬁcation of the deﬁ-
nition of “outcome”, since the action sets in two classes of game diﬀer).10
In a recent paper, Morgan and Va´rdy [9] analyze a class of costly observa-
tion games with continuum action sets, and show that the subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome when the follower automatically observes the leader’s
action cannot be approximated in the game with costly observation. For
the leader to retain commitment power, she must randomize; however, if the
follower’s payoﬀ function is strict concave, then he plays pure at every in-
formation set. If the leader’s payoﬀ function satisﬁes some strict concavity
assumptions, then it has a unique maximizer, and randomization becomes
impossible. This is an interesting and important point, and follows from
considerations that are quite distinct from those in the present paper. How-
ever, this is not a failure of accessibility result strictly speaking, since the
action sets in the limit game, where the follower automatically observes the
leader’s action, are diﬀerent from those in the costly observation game, where
10Morgan and Va´rdy [8] conduct an experimental investigation of this type of game. For
small observation costs, the leader’s payoﬀ is close to that of the Stackelberg outcome;
however, the randomization probabilties do not vary with the observation cost as predicted
by theory.
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the follower has to make a choice.11
To conclude, our basic results follow from the fact that mixed strategies
played in an economic environment must satisfy a stringent generalized indif-
ference principle. Since mixed equilibria are required in order to approximate
Stackelberg outcomes, outcomes with perfect observation may well be very
diﬀerent from those under imperfect observation. In consequence, Bagwell’s
point, that one should be cautious in focusing upon commitment eﬀects un-
der perfect observation, appears to be valid when we consider games played
in economic environment. It is possible that many economic applications
may fall into this category, since payoﬀs to agents who choose actions are
aﬀected by the prices set by other agents.
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